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One of the main themes of international economics is that trade relationships have 
profound implications for the domestic distribution of income.  While there is no question 
that a change in trade policy creates winners and losers, the identity of the winners and 
losers largely depends on the degree to which factors of production can move between 
sectors.  The two polar extremes are embodied in the in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model, where factors are assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors, and the 
Ricardo-Viner model (a.k.a. Specific Factors model) where some factors of production 
are assumed to be completely immobile.  One of the fundamental results of the HOS 
model is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which demonstrates that the economy’s 
abundant factor benefits from trade liberalization, even if employed in the declining 
import-competing sector, and the economy’s scarce factor is harmed by trade 
liberalization, even if employed in the expanding export sector.  By contrast, analysis of 
the Ricardo-Viner model reveals that factors that are trapped in the import-competing 
sector are harmed by trade reform regardless of relative abundance, while factors 
fortunate enough to be tied to the export sector benefit.
2 
Attempts to test these two theories have met with limited success.  Magee (1980) 
tested their predictions by exploiting the fact that they have different implications for 
lobbying activity in the United States.  The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that 
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2 The welfare impact of trade reform on mobile factors is ambiguous, depending on their preferences.   3
capital, an abundant factor in the U.S., should gain from liberalization while low-skilled 
labor, a scarce factor in the U.S., should lose.  Consequently, low-skilled labor and 
capital should have polar opposite views with regard to trade policy even when both are 
employed in the same industry.  On the other hand, if capital and labor are both tied to 
their sector, then the Ricardo-Viner model predicts that capital and labor groups within 
each industry should share the same view on trade policy issues.  Magee showed that 
lobbying behavior on the 1973 Trade Reform Act was consistent with the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem in only 2 of 21 industries.   The Ricardo-Viner model fared much 
better.  In 19 industries labor and capital lobbied for the same type of trade policy.  Irwin 
(1996) also found evidence favoring the predictions of the specific factors model in the 
1923 British election for Parliament, where the main issue was whether or not to adopt 
tariff protection.  He concluded that the main determinants of voting behavior in each 
district were the industry and occupational characteristic of the county.   
Other research has tended to support the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.  For 
example, Rogowski (1987) argues that the theorem can be used to explain the lobbying 
coalitions that have formed in many developed countries since 1850.  Beaulieu (1998, 
2000) and Balistreri (1997) find support for HOS in the voting preferences of Canadians 
with respect to NAFTA, GATT, and the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement of 1989.  
Scheve and Slaughter (1998) offer similar evidence based on the view of trade policy 
held by Americans.  Finally, Beaulieu and Magee (2001) find that both the industry and 
the factor that PACs represented influenced the pattern of their contributions to   4
supporters of NAFTA and GATT in the US.  The factor that the group represents appears 
to be more important than the industry, however, particularly for capital.
 3 
  The fact that the evidence is so mixed should not be too surprising.  These two 
models embody the two most extreme assumptions that can be made about factor 
mobility.  In reality, factors are quasi-fixed, moving between sectors in response to 
changes in factor rewards.  Recognizing this, a number of authors in the 1970s, most 
notably Mayer (1974), Mussa (1974, 1978), and Neary (1978), developed models with 
imperfect factor mobility in which both short-run specific factors and long-run 
Heckscher-Ohlin labor markets are relevant for worker preferences concerning trade 
policy.  Lobbying behavior then depends on factors that determine which time horizon is 
most important to each factor in each industry (e.g., time preference and age profile). 
  Casual observation also suggests that the two models should have difficulty 
explaining the movement of wages, particularly those of low-wage workers, whose labor 
market experience bears little resemblance to that modeled in the HOS or RV settings.  
These workers typically cycle between periods of employment and unemployment, often 
finding it difficult to obtain new jobs quickly.  Moreover, these workers frequently 
encounter significant adjustment costs when switching sectors due to search costs, the 
costs of retraining and the non-trivial amount of time they may spend unemployed.  This 
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experience contrasts with a fundamental assumption embodied in the HOS and RV 
models that factors are fully employed at all times.  The models developed by Mayer, 
Mussa, and Neary also maintain the assumption of full employment and ignore the 
adjustment costs that come hand-in-hand with resource allocation.
4  Since recent papers 
by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b), Trefler (2001), Kletzer (2001) and 
Davidson and Matusz (2001) suggest that these adjustment costs may be significant, it is 
important to take them into account when assessing the link between trade and the 
distribution of income.  
  Building on the tradition established by Mayer, Mussa, and Neary; Davidson, 
Martin, and Matusz (1999) recently extended the HOS model to allow for labor market 
turnover and showed that many of the model’s canonical results were altered.  In their 
model, labor and capital are treated as quasi-fixed in the sense that displaced factors must 
search for new production opportunities once a job dissolves.  Thus factors face 
employment risk and the rate at which jobs are created and destroyed plays a role in 
determining the allocation of resources. In such a setting, any change in trade patterns 
creates unemployment and generates adjustment costs. The result is a more nuanced view 
of the link between trade and the distribution of income. 
The picture that emerges from the DMM model has features that derive from both 
the HOS and RV models.  In particular, when labor market turnover is modeled, the 
impact of trade liberalization on factor rewards is made up of a convex combination of 
Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner forces.  Stolper-Samuelson forces dominate in 
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sectors with high labor market turnover, while the Ricardo-Viner forces dominate in 
sectors that are characterized by low turnover.  Intuitively, if jobs are difficult to find but 
durable once obtained (that is, if turnover is low), then a worker’s attachment to the 
sector will be strong.  In this case, the difficulty of finding reemployment and the 
durability of current employment creates an attachment that makes workers act as if they 
have sector specific skills. On the other hand, if a sector is characterized by high turnover 
in the sense that jobs are easy to find or do not last long once secured, then the worker’s 
attachment to that sector will be weak.  In this case, the return to those workers will vary 
with trade policy as if they were perfectly mobile across sectors.  One of the main 
conclusions of the DMM model is that the link between trade and the distribution of 
income should be dependent on job turnover, which varies widely across industries.
5 
In this paper, we test the link between industry turnover and trade preferences.
6  
We combine data on PAC contributions with the Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) 
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data on job creation and job destruction in US manufacturing industries to examine how 
the pattern of campaign contributions varies across industries and factors of production.  
We use the data to undertake non-parametric tests of intuitive propositions that emerge 
from the Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) model.  Consistent with the theory, the 
empirical work suggests that labor market turnover plays an important role in the 
determination of lobbying activity aimed at influencing trade policy. 
The remainder of the paper divides into three sections. The following section 
presents a simple model of adjustment to trade liberalization and discusses some intuitive 
empirical predictions.  Section 3 then describes the data while section 4 reveals the 
empirical links between industry turnover and political preferences.  The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Model 
Suppose that a trade liberalization agreement raises the returns to producing 
export goods and lowers the returns to producing import-competing goods.  If a factor is 
permanently attached to its sector, then workers and capital in import-competing 
industries are harmed by the liberalization and those in exporting industries benefit.  If 
factors are perfectly mobile, on the other hand, then the abundant factor gains while the 
scarce factor loses, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows.  Davidson, Martin, and 
Matusz (1999) present a general model encompassing these two extreme cases, in which 
job matches between capital and labor do not last forever and new matches are difficult to 
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find.  As job matches are destroyed in import-competing industries in response to 
liberalization, the dislocated factors begin searching for (and eventually find) new jobs in 
exporting industries.  Job destruction and creation rates of zero result in the specific 
factor model while a job creation rate approaching infinity generates the model with 
perfect mobility. 
Assuming that the country is capital abundant, the time paths of real wages and 
returns to capital that emerge from the DMM analysis are illustrated in Figure 1, in which 
td Π  ( ft Π ) represents the tariff-distorted (free trade) price index.  Liberalization results 
in an immediate gain for workers and capital owners in exporting industries and a loss for 
those in import-competing industries.  In the long-run, liberalization generates an 
increased return for capital, the abundant factor, and a loss for the scarce factor labor.  
The bold line represents the time path of real factor prices for a low turnover industry 
while the dashed line shows the transition path for a high turnover industry.  Intuitively, 
high turnover industries reach the new equilibrium steady-state in a shorter period of time 
than low turnover industries. 
Figure 1 reveals that labor initially employed in the import-competing sector (the 
upper left graph) is harmed by liberalization, while capital initially employed in the 
export sector (the lower right graph) clearly benefits.  In contrast, the impact of 
liberalization on the real incomes of labor initially employed in the export sector and on 
capital originally employed in the import-competing sector is ambiguous.  At first, labor 
employed in the export sector is better off since the real wage in this sector increases 
while losses do not occur until later.  The situation is reversed for capital initially 
employed in the export sector, where the losses are up front and the gains are delayed.   9
Given a particular discount factor, the net impact on the real incomes of labor 
groups in exporting industries and capital groups in import-competing industries hinges 
on how fast the economy reaches the new steady state.  Higher turnover rates speed the 
adjustment to the new steady state, shortening the time that labor initially employed in 
the export sector enjoys higher real incomes, and reducing the time that capital initially 
employed in the export sector suffers lower real incomes.  For a sufficiently high 
turnover rate, workers in both import-competing and exporting sectors oppose trade 
liberalization while capital owners in both sectors support it, as in the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem.  For a sufficiently low turnover rate, workers and capital owners in import-
competing industries oppose liberalization while factors in exporting industries support it. 
  We investigate these predictions empirically in this paper by examining the 
campaign contributions of political action committees.  These PAC contributions reveal 
interest groups’ trade preferences as long as the PAC cares about affecting election 
outcomes.  In that case, interest groups favoring NAFTA give money primarily to 
candidates expected to vote for trade liberalization while groups against NAFTA give 
money to likely NAFTA opponents.   
 
3.  Data 
Table 1 presents the definitions, sources, and means of the variables used in the 
empirical tests performed in section 4 while Table 2 provides detail on the number of 
PACs and average contributions classified by degree of turnover and net trade status.
7  
The measure of industry turnover used in this study was compiled by Davis and 
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Haltiwanger (1992), and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).  These authors 
calculated the change in the number of jobs lost in shrinking establishments (for job 
destruction) and the change in the number of jobs gained in growing establishments (job 
creation) relative to the employment base within the industry.   The job destruction 
measure for sector s in time period t is 




















JD ,                (1) 
where  et y  is employment in establishment e,  st Y  is total employment in sector s, and  st E  
is the set of establishments in sector s at time t.
8 
While these data are referenced in the literature as measuring gross job flows, 
they are in fact measures of the net change in establishment size over one year.  Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1992) discuss several different measures of job turnover based on their 
data on changes in establishment size.  This paper uses the average job destruction rate as 
defined in (1) between 1988 and 1992 as the measure of industry turnover since the job 
destruction rate is closely tied to the notion of job security in our model, though we 
experiment with alternative specifications of turnover discussed in Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992) in order to explore the robustness of our results. 
In order to link political action committees to the industry they represent, we use a 
data set from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) that places 217 manufacturing 
PACs into groups of 4-digit SIC industries.  Using descriptions of each company and 
union available on the internet, we are able to identify the 2, 3, and 4-digit SIC industry 
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affiliations of 202 other corporate and labor PACs that gave money to House members 
who voted on the bills enacting the NAFTA or Uruguay Round agreements. These 
political action committees are identified as representing either capital or labor interests 
based on the Federal Election Commission classification of each PAC as a corporate or 
labor group.  In total, the data set consists of 42 labor and 377 corporate PACs. 
Each interest group is classified as representing import-competing or exporting 
interests based on the net trade position of the PAC’s industries of origin.  The PAC net 
export position equals one if the industries’ total exports were greater than imports over 
the period 1988-1992, and it equals zero otherwise.  Under this definition, the data set 
includes 226 import-competing interest groups and 193 exporting PACs.  The trade flow 
data used to make these calculations are taken from the NBER US imports and exports 
data sets (www.nber.org) that are described in Feenstra (1996, 1997).   
The Federal Election Commission provides information on the contributions each 
PAC gives to every candidate in the House of Representatives.  In this paper, we examine 
three different measures of whether the contributions were given primarily to supporters 
of trade liberalization.  These measures are the share of contributions that were given to 
representatives who voted for NAFTA, the share given to candidates voting to approve 
the GATT Uruguay Round, and the share given to supporters of both NAFTA and the 
GATT bills.  About 54% of representatives voted for NAFTA, 67% voted for the GATT 
bill, and 46% voted for both trade bills.  Because the literature is divided on the issue of 
whether contributions are given to help elect favorable candidates or after the 
congressional votes the PACs are interested in, we examine contributions from both   12
1991-92 (the election cycle immediately prior to the trade votes) and from 1993-94, when 
the votes were being cast. 
 
4.  Empirical Evidence 
Table 3 provides non-parametric evidence on the predictions of the model 
described in section 2.  In high turnover industries, we should observe a large difference 
between capital and labor groups in the fraction of contributions given to NAFTA 
supporters.  Low turnover industries should reveal a much smaller difference between 
capital and labor groups as the Stolper-Samuelson effects are less important.  Low 
turnover industries, however, should reveal a much larger difference between import-
competing and exporting PACs in the fraction of contributions given to NAFTA 
supporters.  Table 3 presents the fraction of PAC contributions given to congressional 
representatives who voted for NAFTA, for GATT, and for both bills.  Lobby groups 
representing the interests of capital owners in low turnover industries, for example, gave 
almost 61 percent of their contributions in 1991-92 to representatives who ultimately 
voted in favor of NAFTA.  The table splits groups into low and high turnover PACs 
based on whether the turnover rate in the industries represented by the PAC was below or 
above the median in the data set. 
The results in Table 3 provide strong support for the model’s predictions.  In high 
turnover industries, capital groups gave a significantly larger fraction of their 
contributions to NAFTA supporters, to GATT supporters, and to supporters of both trade 
bills, than did labor groups.  In low turnover industries, however, the difference between   13
capital and labor groups in their support for free traders was much smaller and 
insignificant by all three measures of representatives’ trade policy stances. 
Table 3 also supports the model’s prediction that the industry net export position 
will be important in determining interest group support for trade liberalization only in 
low turnover industries.  In low turnover industries, PACs representing exporting 
industries gave a significantly greater portion of their contributions to supporters of trade 
liberalization than did import-competing PACs.  In high turnover industries, however, the 
difference between import-competing and exporting PACs in their contribution patterns 
was negligible, as the model predicts. 
The hypothesis examined in this paper can be most directly tested using a 
difference in differences approach.  The DMM model prediction is that Stolper-
Samuelson forces will be stronger in industries that correspond to the assumption of 
perfect factor mobility.  Thus, the difference between capital and labor groups’ support 
for free trade should be larger among high turnover industries than among low turnover 
industries.  The bottom part of Table 3 presents this difference in differences comparison.  
Within high turnover industries, there is a 33 percentage point difference between capital 
and labor PACs’ share of contributions going to NAFTA supporters, while in low 
turnover industries, this difference is only about 8 percentage points.  The t-statistic in the 
final column reveals that we can reject the null hypothesis that these two differences are 
equal at the 1% level.  The high turnover difference between capital and labor groups’ 
support for free traders is also significantly greater than the low turnover difference using 
both trade bills as a measure of representatives’ support for liberalization.     14
If specific factors forces are strongest in low turnover industries, meanwhile, we 
should observe a larger difference between exporting and import-competing groups’ 
support for free trade in low turnover sectors than in high turnover sectors.  The bottom 
half of Table 3 reveals some support for this hypothesis.  All three difference in 
differences comparisons have the correct sign, and the export-import gap is significantly 
greater than zero using NAFTA as a measure of representatives’ trade policy stance. 
While Table 3 presents results for combined data on PACs representing capital 
and labor, there are reasons to expect these groups to behave in different ways.  For 
example, capital income is presumably easier to diversify than labor income and such 
diversification may dilute the sector-specific interests of capital owners (Feeney and 
Hillman, 2001).
9  To see if there are any important differences in the behavior of PACs 
representing the two factors and to make sure that each group independently behaves as 
the DMM model predicts, Table 4 splits PACs into four categories: import-competing 
capital and labor groups and exporting capital and labor groups. The upper half of the 
table reveals that in low turnover industries, there is no significant difference between 
capital and labor groups (either in exporting or in import-competing industries) in their 
support for representatives voting in favor of trade liberalization.  Using the GATT vote, 
however, there is a significant difference between exporting and import-competing PACs.  
Both within capital PACs and within labor unions, exporters gave significantly larger 
shares of their contributions to representatives voting in favor of the GATT Uruguay 
Round. 
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In high turnover industries, the data reveal a very different pattern.  In this case 
there are large and statistically significant differences between capital and labor groups, 
both within exporting and within import-competing industries.  Capital PACs 
consistently favored free traders for their contributions much more strongly than labor 
groups did.  In contrast, net exporting groups did not concentrate their contributions on 
free traders more highly than import-competing groups did.  These results are again 
supportive of the idea that high turnover industries conform to the predictions of the free 
mobility Heckscher-Ohlin model whereas low turnover industries exhibit contribution 
patterns more consistent with the specific factors model. 
In order to provide a robustness check on these results, Table 5 duplicates Table 3 
using contributions made during 1993-94, when the NAFTA and GATT Uruguay Round 
bills were being voted on in the Congress.  Notice that during this period, capital groups 
gave significantly larger shares of their money to NAFTA and GATT supporters than did 
labor groups, in both high and low turnover industries.  As the theory predicts, however, 
the Stolper-Samuelson forces are stronger in the high turnover industries.  The difference 
between capital and labor in the fraction of their contributions going to free traders is 
greater within high turnover industries than within low turnover industries by all three 
measures, significantly so for the NAFTA comparison.   
Comparing exporting and import-competing industries, Table 5 tells the same 
story as Table 3.  For two of the three measures of representatives’ positions on trade 
policy, low turnover exporting PACs gave significantly greater fractions of their 
contributions to free traders than did low turnover import-competing PACs.  Among high 
turnover groups, however, there was no significant difference between import-competing   16
and exporting PACs in their contribution patterns.  Although the gap between export and 
import-competing groups’ support for free trade is larger in low turnover industries by all 
three measures, none of the difference in differences is significantly greater than zero. 
Table 6 shows that the difference between exporting and import-competing PACs 
in their 1993-94 contribution patterns comes primarily from within capital groups.  
Among corporate PACs in low turnover industries, ones representing exporters gave 
significantly greater contributions to free trade supporters (by all three measures) than did 
those representing import-competing interests.  The difference between exporters and 
import-competing groups is not evident within high turnover industries, however.  
Examining only labor groups reveals no significant differences in the contribution 
patterns of exporting and import-competing PACs, for either high or low turnover 
industries.  As in Table 5, while there are some significant differences between capital 
and labor groups in low turnover industries, the Stolper-Samuelson forces emerge much 
more clearly within the high turnover industries. 
Table 7 examines the PAC contribution patterns after controlling for industry 
fixed effects.  Since the PACs are defined to the 4-digit industry level, there is variation 
between the turnover rates of different PACs within the same 2-digit industry, and it is 
possible to identify the relationship between turnover and contribution patterns even after 
removing the more aggregate industry effects.  The numbers in the table show the 
average residual from a regression of the fraction of contributions going to free trade 
supporters on a series of 2-digit SIC industry dummy variables.  Capital PACs in low 
turnover industries, for instance, gave about a 1 percentage point greater share of their 
contributions to NAFTA supporters than the average PAC in those industries, while labor   17
groups gave about a 7 percentage point smaller share.  The table shows that controlling 
for industry means does not alter the result that there is a larger difference between 
capital and labor group contribution patterns in high turnover industries than in low 
turnover industries.  On that score, the results are nearly identical to Table 3.  Controlling 
for industry fixed effects does, however, weaken the result that exporting PACs give 
significantly greater shares of contributions to free trade supporters in low turnover 
industries. 
Table 8 investigates whether differences in support for each political party 
between capital and labor groups are driving the results.  The first three columns of 
numbers in the table show the fraction of contributions going to free trade supporters 
among contributions to Republicans only, while the last three columns examine 
contributions to Democrats only.  The results remain quite supportive of the hypothesis 
presented in this paper.  Among contributions to Republicans, capital groups favored free 
traders more strongly than labor groups did in both high and low turnover industries.  The 
mean difference between the two groups was consistently larger in the high turnover 
industries, however.  Among Democrats, the results are even stronger, with large and 
statistically significant differences between capital and labor groups’ support for free 
traders in high turnover industries but no significant differences between capital and 
labor’s contribution patterns in low turnover industries. 
The hypothesis that low turnover industries will exhibit a more stark difference 
between exporting and import-competing PACs than high turnover industries is also 
supported in Table 8.  In low turnover industries, exporters gave significantly greater 
support to free traders than did import-competing PACs using all three measures among   18
Republican recipients and for the GATT measure among Democrats.  In high turnover 
industries, only the GATT measure among Republicans reveals any significant difference 
between exporting and import-competing PAC contribution patterns. 
Furthermore, the bottom half of Table 8 reveals that the difference between 
capital and labor groups’ support for free trade is significantly larger among high 
turnover industries than among low turnover industries for three of the six comparisons: 
NAFTA within both parties, and both trade bills within Democrats.  The other three 
capital-labor difference in differences comparisons are correctly signed but not 
significantly greater than zero.  The gap between export and import-competing groups’ 
support for free trade is significantly larger within low turnover industries than within 
high turnover industries for the NAFTA and both trade bill comparisons among 
Republicans. 
A brief overview of the results in tables 3 – 8 illustrates the support in the data for 
the hypothesis from DMM examined here.  In these tables there are 27 variations of the 
comparison between the contribution patterns of capital and labor PACs.  Among the 
high turnover industries, capital PACs gave a significantly larger fraction (at the 10% 
significance level or better) of their contributions to free trade supporters than labor 
groups did in all 27 comparisons.  Among low turnover industries, capital groups gave 
significantly more money to free traders in only 10 of the 27 comparisons.  Examining 
import-competing and exporting industries provides a different story.  Among high 
turnover industries, exporting PACs never donated a significantly larger fraction of their 
contributions to free traders than did import-competing PACs.  Among low turnover   19
industries, exporting groups gave significantly more support to free traders than import-
competing groups in 14 of the 27 comparisons. 
We also find broad support for the prediction that the difference between capital 
and labor groups’ support for free traders will be larger in high turnover industries than in 
low turnover industries.  This difference in differences is correctly signed in 26 of the 27 
comparisons in tables 3 – 8, with 12 significant at the 1% level, three at the 5% level and 
one at the 10% level.  The data provide only slightly weaker support for the prediction 
that low turnover interest groups will demonstrate a larger difference between exporters 
and import-competing industries in their support for free traders.  This difference in 
differences comparison is correctly signed in 24 of the 27 comparisons, with eight 
significant at the 10% level or better (three of these at the 1% level). 
In previous versions of this paper we ran a variety of tests to check the robustness 
of the results presented in Tables 3-8.  For example, using alternative measures of 
turnover, such as the sum of job creation and job destruction or the minimum of these 
two variables, yields essentially the same results.  We also ran regressions in which 
representatives’ votes were treated as endogenous.  These regressions incorporated 
measures of workers’ skill levels in an industry, PAC, candidate, and industry fixed 
effects and controlled for representatives’ party affiliation, committee membership, terms 
in office, and leadership positions.  In each case, the results provided broad support for 
the hypothesis advanced in this paper.  Finally, we also included a measure of the 
industry capital-labor ratio and interacted this variable with PAC factor and net export 
variables in order to make sure that the PACs were not reacting to factor intensities.  As   20
with the other robustness checks, this did not alter the results presented in Tables 3-8.  
These alternative tests can be found in Magee, Davidson, and Matusz (2003).
10 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  Goldberg and Maggi (1999) suggest that “factors linked to unemployment may 
affect protection through channels different than the ones suggested by the (Grossman 
and Helpman 1994) theory.”  Goldberg and Maggi speculate that it would be empirically 
rewarding to incorporate sector-specific unemployment rates into the Grossman-Helpman 
framework.  Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) provide a theoretical basis for linking 
industry turnover and international trade, and they show that high turnover industries will 
be ruled by Stolper-Samuelson forces while the specific factors model is more applicable 
to low turnover industries.  This paper empirically examines the hypothesis that industry 
turnover can be used to divide interest groups into those whose trade preferences should 
be determined primarily by their factor of production and those whose preferences 
depend mainly on the industry’s net export position. While both short-run specific factors 
and long-run Heckscher-Ohlin considerations will affect interest group trade preferences, 
this paper reveals that industry turnover influences the relative importance of these 
considerations.   
We use data on campaign contributions to supporters and opponents of NAFTA 
and GATT in the U.S. House of Representatives to investigate the link between industry 
turnover and political groups’ trade policy preferences.  The empirical results support the 
                                                 
10 The only exception is the results of the regression in which we interacted capital intensity with PAC 
factor and net export variables.  These results are available from the authors upon request.   21
predictions in Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) and are quite intuitive.  There is 
strong and robust evidence that the factor (either capital or labor) a PAC represents exerts 
a very large effect on the share of its contributions flowing to free trade supporters for 
high turnover industries but has a much smaller impact for low turnover industries.  
There is also evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the industry net trade position has a 
large impact on lobbying behavior only in low turnover industries.  The empirical results 
strongly suggest that industry turnover affects the determinants of interest group trade 
preferences in an intuitive manner.   22
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Table 1: Variable definitions, sources, and summary statistics 






(tables 2, 3, 6, 7) 
1991-92 contributions to 
NAFTA supporters / 
contributions to NAFTA 






0.60 0.28  0.63 
Contributions to 
GATT supporters  
(tables 2, 3, 6, 7) 
1991-92 contributions to 
GATT supporters / 
contributions to GATT 






0.73 0.22  0.75 
Contributions to 
supporters of both  
(tables 2, 3, 6, 7) 
1991-92 contributions to 
supporters of NAFTA & 
GATT / contributions to  










(tables 4, 5) 
1993-94 contributions to 
NAFTA supporters / 
contributions to NAFTA 






0.57 0.28  0.49 
Contributions to 
GATT supporters  
(tables 4, 5) 
1993-94 contributions to 
GATT supporters / 
contributions to GATT 






0.69 0.25  0.73 
Contributions to 
supporters of both  
(tables 4, 5) 
1993-94 contributions to 
supporters of NAFTA & 
GATT / contributions to  






0.46 0.27  0.61 
Turnover  Average job destruction 






8.63 2.62  8.38 
Capital  =1 if PAC is corporate,  






0.90 0.30  1 
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Table 1 (continued): Variable definitions, sources, and summary statistics 
 
Variable Definition  Source  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
Median
Export industry  =1 if PAC industry exports 
is greater than imports 




0.46 0.50  1 
NAFTA 
supporter 







0.54 0.50  1 







0.67 0.47  1 
Both trade bills 
supporter 
=1 if representative voted 




0.46 0.50  0 
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Table 2: Average contributions from PACs to representatives 
 
 
High Turnover  Capital Labor  Subtotal 


















     
     
Low Turnover  Capital Labor  Subtotal 


















     
     







The numbers of PACs in each cell are in parentheses 
Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
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Table 3: Fraction of 1991-92 PAC contributions given to free trade proponents  
 
 Capital  Labor 
Low turnover     
Capital – labor difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.609  0.531 1.188   
GATT 0.728  0.672  1.021   
Both 0.515  0.456  0.929   
        
High turnover        
NAFTA 0.636  0.307 5.726  *** 
GATT 0.746  0.635  2.294  ** 
Both 0.543  0.265  5.047  *** 
        




Low turnover     
Export – import-
competing difference  
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.624  0.577 1.286  * 
GATT 0.748  0.692  1.867  ** 
Both 0.531  0.484  1.339  * 
        
High turnover        
NAFTA 0.586  0.602  -0.381   
GATT 0.759  0.718  1.248   
Both 0.516  0.506  0.259   
 
 
Difference in differences 
  High turnover  Low turnover 
  Capital – labor 
difference  
Capital – labor 
difference 
High – low turnover 
difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.329  0.079  4.04  *** 
GATT 0.111  0.056  1.07   
Both 0.278  0.059  3.70  *** 
        
  High turnover  Low turnover 
  Export – import 
difference 
Export – import 
difference 
High – low turnover 
difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA -0.016  0.047 -1.60  * 
GATT 0.042  0.056  -0.45   
Both 0.010  0.046  -0.97   
 
Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
*, **, *** Indicate that the means or differences are significantly different at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels (respectively) in one-sided t-tests.   29
Table 4: Fraction of 1991-92 PAC contributions given to free trade proponents 
 
Low turnover industries 
 
 Capital     Labor 
t-statistic 
H0 : fraction given 
by capital equals 






































H0 : fraction given by net 
exporters equals fraction 
























































H0 : fraction given by net 
exporters equals fraction 







   -1.143 
 1.139 









Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
*, **, *** Indicate that the means are significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (respectively) in one-sided t-tests.   30
Table 5: Fraction of 1993-94 PAC contributions given to free trade proponents 
 
 Capital  Labor 
Low turnover     
Capital – labor difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.580  0.461 1.781  ** 
GATT 0.709  0.614  1.630  * 
Both 0.477  0.291  2.975  *** 
        
High turnover        
NAFTA 0.599  0.272 4.871  *** 
GATT 0.705  0.539  2.690  *** 
Both 0.495  0.227  4.044  *** 
        




Low turnover     
Export – import-
competing difference  
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.586  0.550 0.963   
GATT 0.738  0.653  2.655  *** 
Both 0.497  0.416  2.322  ** 
        
High turnover        
NAFTA 0.573  0.556 0.370   
GATT 0.717  0.668  1.199   
Both 0.501  0.444  1.237   
 
 
Difference in differences 
  High turnover  Low turnover 
  Capital – labor 
difference  
Capital – labor 
difference 
High – low turnover 
difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.327  0.119  3.11  *** 
GATT 0.166  0.095  1.18   
Both 0.268  0.186  1.28   
        
  High turnover  Low turnover 
  Export – import 
difference 
Export – import 
difference 
High – low turnover 
difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.017  0.036 -0.43   
GATT 0.050  0.085  -0.95   
Both 0.056  0.081  -0.60   
 
Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
*, **, *** Indicate that the means or differences are significantly different at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels (respectively) in one-sided t-tests.   31
Table 6: Fraction of 1993-94 contributions given to free trade proponents 
Low turnover industries 
 
  Capital     Labor 
t-statistic 
H0 : fraction given 
by capital equals 






































H0 : fraction given by net 
exporters equals fraction 
























































H0 : fraction given by net 
exporters equals fraction 












  -0.460 
  -1.350 




Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
*, **, *** Indicate that the means are significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (respectively) in one-sided t-tests.   32
Table 7: Fraction of 1991-92 PAC contributions given to free trade proponents, 2-digit 
SIC industry means removed 
 
 Capital  Labor 
Low turnover     
Capital – labor difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.010  -0.069  1.213   
GATT 0.002  -0.030  0.583   
Both 0.006  -0.046  0.823   
        
High turnover        
NAFTA 0.029  -0.240  4.754  *** 
GATT 0.011  -0.076  1.867  ** 
Both 0.024  -0.193  4.147  *** 
        




Low turnover     
Export – import-
competing difference  
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.015  -0.011  0.714   
GATT 0.008  -0.012  0.683   
Both 0.012  -0.011  0.662   
        
High turnover        
NAFTA -0.018  0.005  -0.552   
GATT 0.018  -0.009  0.865   
Both 0.004  -0.006  0.271   
 
 
Difference in differences 
  High turnover  Low turnover 
  Capital – labor 
difference  
Capital – labor 
difference 
High – low turnover  
difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA 0.269  0.079  3.10  *** 
GATT 0.087  0.031  1.11   
Both 0.216  0.052  2.82  *** 
        
  High turnover  Low turnover 
  Export – Import 
difference 
Export – Import 
difference 
High – low turnover  
difference 
t-statistic 
NAFTA -0.022  0.026 -1.25   
GATT 0.028  0.020  0.24   
Both 0.010  0.023  -0.37   
 
Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
*, **, *** Indicate that the means or differences are significantly different at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels (respectively) in one-sided t-tests.   33
Table 8: Fraction of 1991-92 PAC contributions given to free trade proponents, by party 
 
  _______Republicans only_______  _______Democrats only_______ 
 Capital  Labor  Difference
t-statistic 
Capital Labor  Difference
t-statistic 
Low turnover               
NAFTA 0.766  0.616  1.992 **  0.486  0.459  0.361  
GATT 0.749  0.555 2.769 ***  0.736  0.673  1.005  
Both 0.656 0.501  1.979 **  0.415  0.425  -0.142  
            
High turnover            
NAFTA 0.812  0.503  4.991 ***  0.514  0.240  4.068 ***
GATT 0.758  0.554 3.373 ***  0.758  0.624  2.438 ***
Both 0.692 0.462  3.503 ***  0.452  0.200  3.765 ***













Low turnover               
NAFTA 0.786  0.710  1.904 **  0.482  0.487 -0.121  
GATT 0.772  0.680 2.461 ***  0.752  0.705  1.374 * 
Both 0.682 0.591  2.195 **  0.416  0.415  0.035  
            
High turnover            
NAFTA 0.766  0.796  -0.775   0.482  0.478  0.081  
GATT 0.770  0.720 1.379 *  0.746  0.739  0.195  
Both 0.681 0.665  0.396   0.409  0.428  -0.398  
            
            
Difference in differences 











High – low 
difference 
     t-statistic    t-statistic 
  Capital-labor difference  Capital-labor difference 
NAFTA 0.309  0.150  2.30 **  0.273  0.027  3.46 ***
GATT 0.203  0.194  0.14   0.134  0.063  1.21  
Both 0.230 0.155  1.04   0.252  -0.010  3.76 ***
           
  Export-import difference   Export-import difference   
NAFTA -0.030  0.076  -2.70 ***  0.004  -0.005  0.20  
GATT 0.050  0.092 -1.14   0.007  0.047 -1.10  
Both 0.016 0.091  -1.85 **  -0.019  0.001  -0.46  
 
Low turnover PACs are in industries with lower than the median job destruction rate 
High turnover PACs are in industries with greater than the median job destruction rate 
Export industries are those in which net exports are positive on average from 1988-92 
Import-competing industries have negative net exports on average from 1988-92 
*, **, *** Indicate that the means or differences are significantly different at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels (respectively) in one-sided t-tests.   34








Dashed lines represent high turnover industries 
















































Import-competing capital  Exporting capital 
Import-competing labor  Exporting labor 